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<ABSTRACT> 
 
This paper is an updated, follow-up version of our previous work by accommodating time series 
analysis. We investigated the trends in health care finance that was recently affected by three, i.e., 
integration, separation, and financial reforms. Using the OECD Health Data 2008, we compared the 
performance outcomes of OECD countries longitudinally. We found that total expenditures on health 
relative to the gross domestic product (THE/GDP) rose over the whole years (1980-2006), particularly 
having increased sharply after the three health care reforms in 2000. The time series analysis revealed that 
statistically significant increasing trends in the ratios of THE/GDP, GS/THE, SSS/THE, PHE/THE, and 
PI/THE at10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Meanwhile, the percentage change of the OOP/THE was on the 
way of decreasing trend at 1% level of significance. Based on the results, we conclude that the public 
coverage of our health system has improved over the time with rising portions of government and social 
security financing out of the total health expenditures. The coverage from the private insurance (PI/THE) 
has risen as well over the whole 26 years with statistical significance and then dropped slightly in the post-
reform period (2001-2006). As expected, the social security financing (SSS/THE) increased in the 1990s as 
a result of the full implementation of universal health insurance in 1990.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The purpose of the study is to examine the current status of South Korea’s health care finance 
from worldwide perspective and to document recent evidence owing to the recent financial reform of the 
country in 2000. The comparison was focused on the dimension of health finance that has been central in 
health care debates across countries for years. Our curiosity was concentrated on what was the 
characteristic trend in South Korea’s health care finance during the three decades starting from the 
beginning of our universal health insurance in 1977. The evidence and findings observed from the South 
Korea’s health finance may provide some insight for world health care systems, which have struggled with 
the shared tensions and goals among fair contributions, cost control, and quality services (WHO 2000). 
Moreover, understanding how was the effect of South Korea’s reform in health care may give a reference 
level for the potential effectiveness of similar reforms in other countries.    
 
 
II. History of Korean Health Care Reform1 
 
The South Korean health care system has developed dramatically over the past three decades. The 
most remarkable achievement in its evolution is the adoption of the universal health insurance. Since 1977, 
when the government mandated compulsory medical insurance for employees and their dependents in large 
corporations of more than 500 workers, the national health insurance (HNI) coverage has been continually 
expanding to include more occupational groups of citizens such as government employees, teachers, 
workers in smaller firms and the self-employed.  
To extend the health insurance coverage to its population, the basic strategy adopted by the 
Korean military regime was to separate the working population into employees and the self-employed 
(Peadoby et al. 1995). Mandating employers to cover their employees has been an effective way to extend 
                                                 
1
 Descriptions here were partially adopted from the previous paper, “Performance of Universal Health 
Insurance: Lessons from South Korea” in the World Health and Population (May, 2007), written by the 
same authors, S. Moon and J. Shin. 
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coverage from the government’s perspective. The notable thing associated with the mandatory expansion of 
the coverage in South Korea is that “universal health insurance coverage has been accomplished without 
any major disruption to the overall economy, any apparent harm to specific industries, or any adverse 
impact on small firms” (Anderson 1989; Kwon 2002). Ultimately, all of the South Korean citizens were 
covered through the NHI by 1989.  
Until the economic crisis in 1997, the South Korean universal health insurance system was 
stabilized both financially and administratively. Subject to the minimal guidelines imposed by the central 
government, the decentralized insurance societies, either private-sector initiatives or medical insurance 
societies, served the covered enrollees (Jeong 2005). Each independent insurance society had autonomy in 
managing the scheme for enrollees and set the level of contributions and benefits, collected premiums and 
co-payments, and reimbursed and monitored providers of medical care services for their enrollees (Peabody 
et al. 1995; Kwon 2002; Jeong 2005).  
Financial feasibility was its own responsibility of each society. However, the inefficiency of 
operating 350 individual insurance societies and financial inequity across the health insurance societies 
gradually emerged as serious problems in the administration of the universal health insurance. On top of 
that, the economy-wide financial crisis in 1997 dramatically increased the overall NHI’s financial deficit. 
Concerns regarding both the inequity in health care financing between employment categories and the 
chronic deficit of health insurance societies for the self-employed led the Korean government to instigate 
the integration reform in July, 2000, which involved the merger of all health insurance societies into a 
single insurer, the newly formed government agency of the National Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC) 
(Lee 2003; Jeong 2005; Kwon et al. 2005). Additional to the integration reform for equity and efficiency, 
the South Korean government implemented another major reform in July, 2000: the separation of drug 
prescription by medical doctors and drug dispensing by certified pharmacists in order to improve 
pharmaceutical specialization and quality care (NHIC, 2005). The NHIC covered the entire population of 
the country as beneficiaries to the NHI, i.e., government employees and teachers, the self-employed, and 
industrial workers.  
In the South Korean experience, the rapid expansion to the population coverage, however, has 
resulted in several problems, such as low contribution levels with limited health benefits, little involvement 
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of the public sector in the health care delivery, cost inflation, and financial distress (Kwon 2003: 65). 
Although the launching of the National Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC) and thus the integration 
reform was to improve the financial soundness of the health insurance system, and to enhance the 
efficiency and equity among South Korean beneficiaries, limited number of studies has been completed to 
evaluate the effect of the health care reform in South Korea. The documentation of the process and the 
assessment of the effects from the South Korean case may suggest some implications for different 
countries’ planned reform in health care worldwide (Anderson 1989; Peabody et al. 1995).   
 
 
II. Data and Sample 
 
We used the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Health Data 2008 
and Statistical Year Books from the National Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC) for the analysis. The 
OECD health data 2008 contains rich information on the trends in national expenditures on health, sources 
of health financing, purpose of health-related payment as well as diversified demographic factors of the 
thirty OECD countries over the years of 1980-2006. While complete data are available for each country 
annually, there may be some technical and data collection issues involved in an international comparison. 
Nonetheless, the data are useful in outlining how well a particular health care system is performing and 
have been used in many previous studies (Anderson, 1997). In particular, the data allow researchers to 
evaluate a country’s progress of health system in comparison of that of other industrialized countries.  
 
 
III. Evaluating Trends in Health Care Finance   
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During the period 1990-2008, the South Korean health care spending rapidly increased at an 
average annual rate of 14.8%2, which is the highest growth rate among all 30 OECD countries over the 
period. That was more than 20 time of the median OECD annual growth rate of 3.93 % in Iceland.3  
 
EXHIBIT1 
Trends In The Financial Status Of South Korea’s National Health Insurance (NHI), In Billions Of Korean 
Won, 1990-200  
 
 
 1984 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Revenue 
 
555 639 1,812 2,432 3,269 3,774 4,199 4,711 5,614 6,631 
Expenditure 
 
558 647 1,585 2,164 2,487 2,967 3,458 3,968 5,060 6,446 
Annual 
balance 
-3 -8 227 268 782 807 741 743 554 188 
Accumulated 
Surplusa 
-
b
 -
b
 -
b
 -
b
 -
b
 -
b
 3,432 3,926 4,120 4,002 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Revenue 
 
7,554 8,230 8,892 9,976 12,049 14,405 17,567 19,535 21,237 23,263 
Expenditure 
 
7,766 8,775 9,585 10,919 14,244 14,913 16,097 17,474 20,146 22,944 
Annual 
balance 
-212c -545c -693c -943c -2,195c -508c 1,479 2,061 1,091 319 
Accumulated 
Surplusa 
3,785 3,036 2,243 919 -1,811c -2,572c -1,492c 76 1,255 1574 
 
Source: National Health Insurance Corporation, Statistical Yearbook, various years (Seoul: NHIC)  
Notes: Table formats adopted from Yang et al. (2008: 181).  
aCash flow surplus was reflected only, which excludes NHIC-holding asset values.    
bData not available. 
cDeficit. 
 
Countries like South Korea with more rapid economic growth tend to be characterized as higher 
rates of increase in total expenditures on health. The case of South Korea clearly demonstrates the 
                                                 
2
 South Korea’s total health expenditures per capita was $401 in 1990, which grew dramatically to $1,349 
in 2006 in terms of the U.S dollars at 2000 purchasing power parity (PPP) rates. The average annual growth 
rate was computed by diving the growth rate between the two time points of 1990 and 2006 by the number 
of annual periods equal to 16.  
3
 As of 2005 evaluated at the U.S dollars at 2000 purchasing power parity (PPP) rates, however, the 
absolute dollar value of the total health care expenditure per capita in South Korea ($1,200, 26th) was 
relatively low at less than half the OECD median ($2,662 in Australia). Both of South Korea’s total health 
spending per capita ($1,200, 26th) and as a percent of GDP (6.0%, 29th next to 5.7% of Turkey) were the 
lowest among the five countries (Greece, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, and South Korea) with a similar 
per capita income ranging from $18,000 to $24,000. 
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combination of relatively low initial per capita spending and high growth rate in health costs accompanied 
by a dramatic GDP growth and the extension of insurance coverage and scope of benefits over the three 
decades. South Korea, however, is presumed to be facing a large future challenge in growing health care 
costs associated with her aging population.  
EEHIBIT1 shows the trends in the financial status of South Korea’s national health insurance. The 
annual balance of the national health insurance suffered annual deficits over the period starting from 1997 
through 2002, culminating at -943 Billion Won in 2000. The financial crisis in South Korea’s national 
health insurance was particularly aggravated by inefficient structure for paying bills and unintended 
consequences from the process of the separation of prescribing and dispensing.  
In response to the financial deficits, Korean government prepared a combined set of policies for 
financially stabilizing the national health insurance and adequately implementing the separation of 
prescribing and dispensing on May 31, 2001. On top of that, the “Financial Stabilization Act of National 
Health Insurance” was enacted on January 2002 as a special law, which will be effective from 2003 
through 2006. Under the Financial Stabilization of National Health Insurance Act, the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare overhaul the system to balance the revenue and expenditures through a newly established 
committee for evaluating the overall health system. The government’s obligation to subsidize the national 
health insurance was inscribed in the Financial Stabilization of National Health Insurance Act, which 
guaranteed a stable stream of revenue from government’s central account to the NHIC’s. The South Korean 
government’s efforts to meet the balance in health care achieved the goal in 2004, two years earlier than 
expected. 
However, some researchers like Yoo and Moon (2006: 267-268) point out that, without 
fundamental changes in the delivery system of medical care, South Korean government’s efforts to improve 
the financial healthiness of the national health insurance will lead to only short-run effects. In the long-run, 
concerns were raised repeatedly over the inappropriate and excessive utilization of resources mainly 
generated by the universal coverage in South Korea (Anderson, 1989: 9). Therefore, high coinsurance 
levels and a wide range of uncovered services have been designated in South Korea to reduce the potential 
over-utilization of health services by patients. This response, however, has not been fully successful as 
physicians tended to provide more uncovered services with higher margins than covered services with 
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lower margins (Kwon, 2002: 35) and as patients are misled by profit-pursuing physicians to seek the most 
sophisticated care for modest symptoms (Anderson 1989: 9). The NHIC’s responsibility for cost control in 
health care got more important through tightening the reviewing process of the utilization of services 
among beneficiaries. The essential point may be summarized as providing accessibility to quality care at 
reasonable rates of contribution for consumers and enabling providers to run the business on reasonable 
margins that allow investment in facility and medical technology development.  
 
 
EXHIBIT2 
Trends In Total Health Expenditures and Public Financing of South Korea’s Health Care System, Percent, 
1980-2006  
 
 1980 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
THE / GDPa 3.4 3.4 4.0 4.0 3.9 4.1 4.0 4.0 3.9 4.1 
PHE / THEb 23.2 32.9 34.4 39.5 36.9 36 36.7 35.5 38.1 40.9 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
THE / GDPa 4.1 5.1 4.2 4.5 4.6 5.2 5.5 6.0 5.4 6.4 
PHE / THEb 43.1 53 47.7 48.2 48.5 54.5 52.4 53.1 51.7 55.1 
 
Source: OECD Health Data 2008 (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2008) 
Notes: aPercent of total health expenditures (THE) out of gross domestic product (GDP) 
bPercent of public health expenditure (PHE) out of total health expenditures (THE) 
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EXHIBIT 2 shows the trends in the percent of the total health expenditures out of the gross 
domestic product (THE / GDP) and the percent of the public health expenditures out of the total health 
expenditures (PHE / THE) in over the years 1980-2006. As illustrated in FIGURE 1, the ratio of public 
health expenditures over the total expenditures on health (PHE / THE) increased constantly from 23.2% in 
1980 to more than double percentage point of 55.1% in 2006. That could be mostly explained by the 
gradual expansion of the public insurance coverage owing to the implementation of the national health 
insurance, which began as government-mandated compulsory medical insurance for employees and their 
dependents in large corporations of more than 500 workers in 1977. Coverage of the national health 
insurance was extended to government employees and teachers in January and then to those working in 
corporation with more than 300 employees in July of 1979. Industrial workers working for firms with more 
than 100 employees started to be covered by the NHI in January of 1981. Finally, the universal health 
insurance was further extended to industrial workers belonging to small firms with more than 5 employees 
in 1988. The self-employed and the beneficiaries of the Medical Aid program began to be covered from 
1989 (Kwon, 2002: 17).  
The gradual expansion of the national insurance coverage contributed greatly to the continual 
increase of the ratio of the public spending over the total health expenditures. The coverage expansion 
seems to be enough to explain the rapid increase of public expenditures relative to the total expenditures in 
the years 1980-1990. By the end of 1990, when the national health insurance was fully implemented to 
cover the whole population, the percentage of the public health expenditures (PHE) out of the total health 
expenditures (THE) reached almost 40%. The growth rate of the PHE / THE, 70.3%, far exceeded that of 
the THE / GDP, 17.6%, over the period of implementing the national health insurance in years 1980-1990.    
The quantitative growth in public health care was followed by qualitative growth, which was 
characterized as rising proportion of the covered services out of the total services needed. Expansion of the 
benefit coverage surely led to the rise in public expenditures on health relative to the total expenditures on 
health in 1991-2000. At the initial stage of the national health insurance in South Korea, policy makers 
intended to lower the beneficiaries’ burden by collecting minimum contributions for then-essential medical 
and surgical services, maternity care, hospitalization, pharmaceuticals, acupuncture treatment, etc.  
 10 
However, the “low contributions and limited health benefits (Kwon, 2003: 65)” policy in South 
Korea evolved gradually toward larger benefit package with higher contribution from the beneficiaries in 
the following decade 1991-2000. We believe that the increase in PHE / THE of the second decade 1991-
2000 should be understood in association with South Korean government’s efforts to enlarge the scope of 
the benefit during that period.4      
Secondly, the institutional factors have been involved in the rising growth rates of the public 
health expenditures relative to the total health expenditures. Before the integrated single payer, NHIC, was 
launched in 2000, South Korea’s national health insurance was operated by 350 independent but heavily 
government-regulated health insurance societies. Each independent insurance society had autonomy in 
managing the scheme for enrollees: set the level of contributions and benefits, collect premiums and 
copayments, reimburse and monitor providers of medical care services for their enrollees. Financial 
feasibility was the responsibility of each society (Peabody et al., 1995, Kwon, 2002, Jeong, 2005).    
 However, inefficiency of operating 350 individual insurance societies and financial inequity 
across societies have gradually emerged as serious problems in the administration of the universal health 
insurance. In addition, concerns regarding both the inequity in health care financing between employment 
categories and the chronic deficit of health insurance society for the self-employed led to the merger of all 
health insurance societies into a single insurer in 2000 (Lee, 2003; Jeong, 2005; Kwon and Reich, 2005).5 
The big spike in 1997 for the trend in PHE / THE illustrated by FIGURE 1 may be associated with the 
institutional inefficiencies. For worse, it is true that the economy-wide crisis (Asian Financial Crisis) in 
1997 caused a dramatic increase in the overall financial deficit and triggered the health cost inflation.   
The growth rate of the trend in the public health expenditures over the total health expenditures 
(PHE / THE) was lowered down to 13.6% over the years 2001-2006, while the total health expenditures 
over the gross domestic product (THE / GDP) rose sharply by 39.1% from 2001 to 2006. Private 
                                                 
4
 It is interesting sometimes urgent services such as vaccinations, ultrasounds, MRIs (Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging), home care, traditional medications, meals in hospitalization, and even private rooms (rooms with 
less than six beds) were not covered by the national health insurance in South Korea until 2005.  
5
 Additional to the integration reform for equity and efficiency, the Korean government implemented 
another major reform in 2000: the separation reform for specialization and quality care (NHIC, 2005). By 
the separation reform, the prescription of drugs was specialized to medical doctors and the dispensing of 
drugs was supposed to be conducted only by the certified pharmacists.  
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expenditures from complementary private insurance may have played a role for the lowered growth rate in 
the PHE / THE after the integration and separation reform.   
From cross-sectional comparative perspective, the ratio of the public health spending over the total 
health expenditures (PHE / THE) was 55.1% in South Korea, 2006, compared to much higher rates in other 
OECD countries such as Canada (70.4%), Italy (76.7%), Japan (82.7 %, 2005), U.S. (87.3%). We found 
that South Korea’s ratio of the PHE/THE  was at the 28rd place from the top, leaving behind the U.S. 
(45.8%) and Mexico (44.2%) in 2006. 
The public health expenditure per capita at the purchasing power parity (PPP) rates was low again 
in South Korea ($815), remaining less than half of the OECD median ($1,906 in New Zealand). South 
Korea’s public health expenditure was the lowest among the five countries - Greece ($1,528), New 
Zealand($1,906), Portugal($1,495), Spain($1,751), and South Korea($815) - with a similar GDP per capita.  
In terms of total health expenditures, we report that total health expenditure per capita at the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) rates in South Korea ($1,480) was relatively low at less than half of the 
OECD median ($2,714). South Korea’s total health expenditures per capita and as a percentage of GDP 
were the lowest among the five countries – Greece ($2,483), New Zealand ($ 2,448), Portugal ($2,120), 
Spain ($2,458) and South Korea ($1,480) - with similar per capita income. South Korea is presumed to be 
facing the future challenges in health care costs associated with the aging population.   
EXHIBIT 3 and FIGURE 2 illustrate the recent trends in the factors that constitute the total 
expenditures on health. As desired, the percent of the social security scheme out of the total expenditures 
on health (SSS / THE) started from 13.2% in the early stage of the universal health insurance to reach 
42.6% in 2006, reducing the percent of the out-of-pocket spending relative to total health expenditures 
(OOP / THE) effectively. This implies that the role of the social protection toward the medically needy has 
been strengthened by the national health insurance over time. Relative to the total expenditures on health, 
the percentage financed by government and social security scheme has constantly increased by 25% and 
223% from 1980 to 2006, respectively. The percentage financed by the private insurance rose from 0.8% in 
1980 to 3.3% in 2006 after the integration and separation reform of the health care.  
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EXHIBIT 3 
Trends In The Financing Sources of South Korean Health Care, Percent, 1980-2006  
 
 1980 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Gov’t 
subsidya 
10.0 7.7 9.1 9.0 9.3 8.6 8.5 8.0 8.0 8.6 
Social 
securityb 
13.2 25.2 25.2 30.0 27.6 27.4 28.2 27.5 30.1 32.2 
Oop 
spendingc 
72.8 61.1 60.2 55.5 57.6 57.2 56.1 53.1 52.9 50.5 
Private 
Insuranced 
0.8 1.2 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.5 
Corporationse 3.2 4.8 
 
3.6 3.1 3.5 4.7 5.0 8.8 6.5 6.1 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Gov’t 
subsidya 
9.2 9.6 10.8 10.2 10.3 10.5 9.9 10.4 11.7 12.5 
Social 
securityb 
33.8 38.2 37.5 38.3 44.1 42.6 41.8 42.0 41.4 42.6 
Oop 
spendingc 
47.8 43.4 43.4 42.3 37.3 38.7 39.4 39.2 38.5 36.9 
Private 
Insuranced 
3.0 4.0 3.4 4.3 3.4 3.3 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.3 
Corporationse 6.1 5.0 
 
4.9 4.9 4.8 5.0 4.8 4.6 4.6 4.3 
 
Source: OECD Health Data 2008 (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2008) 
Notes: aPercentage of gov’t subsidy (GS) out of total health expenditures (THE) 
bPercentage of social security scheme (SSS) out of total health expenditures (THE) 
cPercentage of out-of-pocket (OOP) spending out of total health expenditures (THE) 
dPercentage of private insurance (PI) spending out of total health expenditures (THE) 
ePercentage of corporations’ contribution (CC) out of total health expenditures (THE) 
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In South Korea, the high rate of uncovered or inadequately covered services seems to have 
contributed to the rapid growth in the private insurance financing out of the total health expenditures. With 
increased income and advanced medical technologies, strong tendency for pursuing adequate care through 
complementary insurance plan was observed after the health reform in 2000.   
With less support from the central government, the consumer’s share of the health care costs 
measured by per capita out-of-pocket (OOP) spending was high ($492 in 2005) in South Korea, well above 
the OECD median ($402 in 2002). Even after controlling for income effects, South Korean per capita OOP 
spending was second highest after Spain among the five countries with similar income (ranging from 
$18,000 to $24,000) – Portugal ($462), Spain ($516), New Zealand ($374), Greece (N.A.). In Germany and 
Japan, whose health care systems have been the benchmark for molding health care financing of the South 
Korean system, per capita OOP was much smaller ($424 for Germany and $353 for Japan).6 These findings 
suggest that the successful expansion of health insurance coverage in South Korea has not necessarily 
guaranteed satisfactory financial protection against potentially catastrophic medical expenses that an 
average South Korean citizen might be exposed to.  
Furthermore, the low contribution rates of the insured beneficiaries and the stringent public 
funding for the health care system have limited the range of services like benefit-in-kind. The wide variety 
of services commonly received by patients that remain uncovered or inadequately covered by the insurance 
may account for the high OOP spending by South Korea. On the other hand, the high rates of the cost 
sharing may play a role in mitigating the previously mentioned moral hazard effect in utilizing health 
services. Many researchers believe that the introduction of the cost-sharing rule could improve the financial 
stability of the NHIC in South Korea, which is the only insurer of the Korean NHI that has suffered a 
continuous deficit from 1997 through 2003.  
In summary, the benefits of the Korean universal coverage, though its achievement, and especially 
so rapidly, is admirable, should not be overemphasized since in practice, the range of the benefit-in-kind 
contained in the Korean NHI package is insufficient to completely remove the barriers to necessary care 
among the insured South Korean beneficiaries. 
                                                 
6
 Again, the proportion of total OOP spending to total health care expenditure as of 2005 was 38.5 % [the 
3rd highest after Mexico (51.2%) and Greece (n.a.)] in South Korea compared to only 14.5% in Canada, 
13.0% in Germany, 14.3% in Japan and 13.1% in the U.S. 
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EXHIBIT 4 
Trends In The Purpose of Payment in South Korea’s Health Care System, Percent, 1985-2006  
 
 1980 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Administration 
& Insurancea 
6.0 5.0 6.1 6.7 6.8 6.7 6.5 6.3 5.8 6.5 
Medical 
Servicesb 
47.8 51.4 50.3 53.0 50.7 51.9 52.2 50.4 52.8 53.4 
Preventive 
Public Healthc 
3.6 2.4 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.4 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Administration 
& Insurancea 
6.7 6.1 4.8 4.8 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.6 
Medical 
Servicesb 
55.7 59.4 61.2 58.7 60.7 60.0 59.1 59.3 59.6 60.3 
Preventive 
Public Healthc 
2.3 2.4 2.2 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.8 3.0 
 
Source: OECD Health Data 2008 (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2008) 
Notes: aPercent of total spending on administration & Insurance out of total health expenditures (A. & I. / THE) 
bPercent of total spending on medical services out of total health expenditures (Med Serv. / THE) 
cPercent of total spending on preventive public health out of total health expenditures (EPrevH / THE) 
 
FIGURE 3  
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EXHIBIT 4 and FIGURE 3 indicates that, after the integration and separation reform in July, 
2000, the total expenditures on the administration & insurance sector relative to the total expenditures on 
health (A. & I. / THE) decreased significantly on average from 6.1% in the pre-reform years 1991-2000 to 
3.9% in the post-reform period 2001-2006. At a glance, we could reasonably argue that the integration and 
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separation reform in South Korea’s national health insurance saved the administration & insurance costs 
out of the total expenditures on health. Meanwhile, the percentage of total expenditures on medical services 
out of the total health expenditures (Med Serv / THE) slightly increased from 54.6% to 59.8% in the pre-
reform (1991-2000) and post-reform (2001-2006) years, respectively. The mean comparison t-test statistics 
confirmed that the two sets of the average ratios - administration & insurance over total health 
expenditures (|t|=10.042, P=0.000) and medical services over total health expenditures (|t|=3.38, P=0.03) - 
revealed that there was significant difference from ‘before’ to ‘after’ the reform.  
The average percentage of the total expenditures on preventive public health relative to the total 
expenditures on health (EPrevH / THE) didn’t show any statistically significant difference between 2.2% 
on average over the pre-reform years (1991-2000) and 2.23% in the post-reform years (2001-2006). Thus, 
we could say that in conclusion the total expenditures on the ‘administration & insurance’ as well as those 
on the ‘medical services’ increased from before to after the reform, which was characterized as the 
integration of the 350 “quasi-public health care agencies” (Kwon, 2002: 38) and separating drug 
prescribing and dispensing in July, 2000. However, the total expenditures on the preventive public health 
relative to the total health expenditures did not change significantly across the two time periods (before and 
after the reform).  
In recognition of the fact that one of the important and basic philosophies of the integration 
reform was to realize a holistic medicine in South Korea’s health system through ambitious expansion of 
the investment on the a preventive medicine, more expedited efforts need to be endeavored from the 
Korean government to facilitate necessary infrastructures for better community health and to deliver 
preventive medical services through local public hospitals.   
The impact of the structural changes in the health care system was documented with the ARIMA 
(1,0, 1) model in EXHIBIT 5. In relation to total expenditures on health, the effects of the universal health 
insurance and integration and separation reform on the variables of healthcare finance was captured by two 
binary indicators. The first time dummy for implemented universal health insurance was constructed with 
values equal to 1 for years 1980-1990 and 0 for other years. Then, the second dummy was designed to 
indicate the post-reform years (2001-2006) as equal to 1 and 0 for other years.  
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EXHIBT 5 
Impact of Structural Changes of Health Care Reform. ARIMA(1, 0, 1) Model, Percent, 1980-2006  
 
 GS / THEa   SSS / THEb OOP / THEc PI  / THEd CC / THE e 
Year (trend) 
 
0.092 (1.96)** 0.747 (5.66)*** -1.060 (-3.03)*** 0.160 (3.86)*** 0.074 (0.57) 
1980-1989 
 
0.417 (0.64) -5.346 (-5.90)*** 4.005 (0.74) 0.141 (0.18) -0.351 (-0.32) 
2001-2006 
 
0.822 (1.20) 2.777 (1.51)  -3.670 (-1.64) -0.869 (-2.66)** -1.028 (-0.51) 
Constant 
 
7.84 (10.56)*** 20.991(10.32)*** 67.711 (9.58)*** 0.231 (0.27) 3.968 (2.28)** 
AR Lag 1. 
 
0.39 (1.12) 0.451 (2.15)** 0.530 (2.20)** 0.670 (2.23)** 0.362 (0.32) 
MA Lag 1. 
 
1.449 (2.15)** 0.999 (0.00) 0.323 (0.87) -0.277 (-0.81) 0.057 (004) 
 THE / GDPf PHE / THEg A. & I. / THEh EPrevE / THEi MS / THEj 
Year (trend) 
 
0.051 (1.82)* 1.220 (4.75)*** -0.052 (-0.54) -0.022 (-0.40) 0.247 (0.85) 
1980-1989 
 
-0.109 (-0.34) 0.324 (0.12) -0.692 (-0.59) -0.168 (-0.13) -2.952 (-0.90) 
2001-2006 
 
0.976 (3.37)*** 
 
0.235 (0.07) -1.341 (-1.13) -0.218 (-0.39) 2.869 (0.73) 
Constant 
 
3.300 (7.22)*** 22.262 (6.31)*** 6.645 (3.56)*** 3.180 (2.23)** 51.043 (90.9)*** 
AR Lag 1. 
 
0.544 (1.26) 0.260 (0.19) 0.515 (1.32) 0.892 (4.39)*** 0.621 (3.09)** 
MA Lag 1. 
 
-1.000(-0.00) 0.077 (0.05) 0.446 (1.12) -0.036(-0.09) 0.350 (1.16) 
 
Source: OECD Health Data 2008 (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2008) 
Notes: Asymptotic Z-statistics are reported in the bracket. *<0.1, **<0.05, ***<0.01 
aPercent of government subsidy out of total health expenditures (GS / THE) 
bPercent of social security scheme out of total health expenditures (SSS / THE) 
cPercent of out-of-pocket spending out of total health expenditures (OOP / THE) 
dPercent of private insurance spending out of total health expenditures (PI / THE) 
ePercent of corporations’ contribution out of total health expenditures (CC / THE) 
fPercent of total health expenditures out of gross domestic product (THE / GDP) 
gPercent of public health expenditures out of total health expenditures (PHE / THE) 
hPercent of total spending on administration & Insurance out of total health expenditures (A. & I. / THE) 
iPercent of total spending on preventive public health out of total health expenditures (EPrevH / THE) 
jPercent of total spending on medical services out of total health expenditures (MS / THE) 
 
 
The time series analysis revealed that statistically significant increasing trends in the ratios of 
THE/GDP, GS/THE, SSS/THE, PHE/THE, and PI/THE at10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Meanwhile, the 
percentage change of the OOP/THE was on the way of decreasing trend at 1% level of significance. Based 
on the results, we could say that the public coverage of the health care system has improved over time with 
rising portions of government and social security financing. The private coverage from the private 
insurance (PI/THE) has risen as well over the whole 26 years with statistical significance and then dropped 
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slightly in the post-reform period (2001-2006). As expected, the social security coverage (SSS/THE) has 
risen in the 1990s as a result of full implementation of the universal health insurance completed by the year 
1990. Total expenditures on health relative to the gross domestic product (THE/GDP) was on rising trend 
over the whole years (1980-2006), particularly increasing sharply after the recent three – integration, 
separation, and financial - reforms with significant p-values. 
The statistical association was examined between a variety of variables in health care finance and 
total health expenditures in the EXHIBIT 6. To accommodate the residuals’ serially correlated distributive 
nature, we applied five models – two cross sectional and three ARIMA frameworks – to the data composed 
of eight variables as described in the notes section of the EXHIBIT 6. The standard OLS model followed 
by three auto-correlation tests  - standard Durbin-Watson, Durbin’s alternative, and Breusch-Godfrey 
lagrange multiplier (LM) auto correlation tests – confirmed that there was significant serial correlation at 
5% level in the residual distribution for all lags. Thus, the null hypothesis that there was no serial 
correlation was safely rejected. Column (2) reports the correlation coefficient estimates from the Newey-
West OLS model with the autocorrelation-corrected standard errors. Estimated regression coefficients are  
mostly same as those of the standard OLS results except for autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics in the 
brackets.  
The ARIMA models are defined as assuming the differentiated auto-regressive (AR), moving 
average (MA) process of the disturbance terms. We applied three ARIMA models – (1,0,1), (2,1,0), and (3, 
1, 0) - to the data in use, hoping to pick up the best one in terms of the highest model fit indicated by log 
likelihood scores. Among the three, ARIMA (p=3, I=1, q=0) exhibited the highest fit to the data with log 
likelihood score equal to 44.02, which was higher than the other two. The auto-correlation coefficient of the 
moving average (MA) process was suppressed in column (3) of the ARIMA (1,1,1) model. Thus, we get to 
know the true model would not include the MA process as exemplified in column (4) and (5). On top of 
that, all of the eight variables that were included in the regression analysis were carefully transformed to 
the natural log forms to be suitably fit to the assumed linear relationship between the regressors and 
dependent variable. Moreover, the log transformation is supposed to reduce the variances of the dependent 
variable that are normally assumed as stochastic in regression analysis.     
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EXHIBT 6 
Statistical Association of Sources of Health Care Finance with the National Total Health Expenditures, 
1990-2006  
 
Dep. Var.:  
Ln_THEa 
Model 1 
OLS 
(1) 
 
Model 2 
Newey-West 
lag_4, (2) 
Model 3 
ARIMA(1,1,1) 
(3) 
Model 4 
ARIMA(2,1,0) 
(4) 
Model 3 
ARIMA(3,1,0) 
(5) 
Ln_GSb -0.002 (-0.00) 
 
-0.002 (-0.01)  0.34 (0.91)  0.28 (0.48)  0.25 (1.53) 
Ln_SSCc -0.39 (-0.40) 
 
-0.39 (-0.56) -0.65 (-0.95) -0.76 (-1.57) -0.48 (-1.90)* 
Ln_OOPd -1.29 (-1.65) 
 
-1.29 (-2.00)* -1.38 (-3.05)*** -1.44 (-1.86)* -1.46 (-13.01)*** 
Ln_Pie -0.55 (-0.84) 
 
-0.55 (-1.04) -0.45 (-0.64) -0.51 (-0.47) -0.7 (-2.01)** 
Ln_A & If  0.83 (1.57) 
 
 0.83 (1.65)  0.9 (3.12)***  0.92 (2.24)**  0.86 (6.41)*** 
Ln_Prevg -0.001 (-0.02) 
 
-0.001 (-0.06) -0.01 (-0.10) -0.01 (-0.47)  0.004 (0.25) 
Ln_Med Sevh -0.82 (-1.01) 
 
-0.82 (-4.20)*** -1.08 (-2.61)*** -0.9 (-1.76)* -0.97 (-6.76)*** 
Year (trend)i  0.28 (2.19)* 
 
0.28 (4.04)*** - - - 
2001-2006j  0.25 (0.89) 
 
 0.25 (0.321)  0.32 (1.67)*  0.32 (1.34)  0.25 (2.73)*** 
Constant  26.6 (2.61)** 
 
 26.59 (3.44)**  0.28 (3.30)***  0.29 (1.78)*  0.3 (7.38)*** 
AR Lag 1 - - -0.86 (-2.98)*** -1.5 (-6.0)*** -2.23 (-23.27)*** 
AR Lag 2 - - - -0.84 (-3.45)*** -2.22 (-25.54)*** 
AR Lag 3 - - - - -0.97 (-12.18)*** 
MA Lag 1 - - -1.0 ( - )k - - 
/sigma - -  0.05 (1.61)  0.05 (2.17)**  0.01 (1.01) 
N  17  17 17 17  17 
R2 
Adj-R2 
F(9,7) 
Prob>F 
Wald chi2 
Prob>chi2 
 0.95 
 0.90 
 16.19 
 0.001 
- 
- 
- 
-  
377.86  
0.0000 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 2782.35 
 0.0000 
Log Likelihood - -  23.75  23.47  44.02 
Durbin-Watson d(10, 17)=2.99 - - - - 
Durbin’s alt. 
autocorr. test 
Reject “H0: no 
serial correl.” 
for all lags  
(1-10) at 5% 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
Breusch-
Godfrey LM 
autocorr. Test 
Reject “H0: no 
serial correl.” 
For all lags  
(1-10) at 5% 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Source: OECD Health Data 2008 (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2008) 
Notes: T-statistics, autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics, and asymptotic z-statistics are reported in the brackets for 
OLS, Newey-West, and ARIMA models, respectively. *<0.1, **<0.05, ***<0.01. 
aNatural log of total health expenditures (THE); bNatural log of gov’t subsidy (Ln_GS);  
cNatural logof social security scheme (Ln_SSS); dNatural log of out-of-pocket spending (Ln-OOP); 
eNatural log of private insurance spending (Ln_PI); fNatural log of total spending on admin. & Insurance (Ln_A & I); 
gNatural log of total spending on preventive public health (Ln_EprevH); hNatural log of total spending on medical 
services (Ln_Med Serv); iYear-specific time trend regressor; jBinary indicator for 1 if year>=2001, 0 otherwise;  
kMoving Average(MA) correlation coefficient depressed as insignificant. 
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The empirical results imply that out-of-pocket payment was adversely associated with the total 
expenditures on health at 1% level of significance. This outcome was consistent with the results from other 
regression models such as Newey-West (column (2) at 10% significance), ARIMA (1,1,1) (column (3) at 
1% significance), and ARIMA (2,1,0) (column (4) at 10% significance). Meanwhile, social security 
financing (Ln_SSS) and private insurance financing (Ln_PI) were adversely associated with the total health 
expenditures at 10% and 5% level, respectively. But this result was not the case of the other models in 
columns (1)-(4). Therefore, we conclude that the adverse correlation between the two regressors, Ln_SSS 
and Ln_PI, and the dependent variable Ln_THE was not robust enough to exist. The administrative & 
insurance (Ln_A&I) and expenditures on medical services (Ln_Med Serv) were positively and adversely 
correlated, respectively, with the total health expenditures at the 1% level of significance. This result was 
consistent with the outcomes from the other ARIMA models for those two regressors (column (3)-(4)) and 
the Newey-West OLS model for Ln_Med Serv only (column (2)).         
  
  
VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
South Korea’s achievement of universal health insurance within 12 years is remarkable. South 
Korea’s incremental expansion of health insurance coverage from private employees in large firms to 
public employees and finally to self-employed rural residents was effective as it allowed private-sector 
manufacturers to smoothly accommodate the cost of providing health plans to their workers. Although the 
South Korean government lacked sufficient funds for universal coverage in 1977, at the commencement of 
the NHI, it was able to evade the heavy financial burden of supporting the NHI system by collecting 
contributions from private health insurance societies and by limiting government subsidies only to 
defaulting societies. Furthermore, the gradual implementation of the universal health plan provided the 
South Korean government with sufficient time to mediate any severe conflicts that might arise among 
insurance societies with varying financial statuses. In this process, the government successfully merged the 
insurance societies into a single insurer, the NHIC, while increasing government assistance to a financially 
challenged group, the self-employed, among NHI beneficiaries.   
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At the launching of the NHI in South Korea, many predicted that it would suffer financial distress, 
but no significant sign of financial instability was observed in the trends in financial receipts and 
disbursements during the early 1990s. Clearly, South Korea benefited from its rapid economic growth 
during the 1990s (Lee 2003). However, the economic crisis of late 1997 introduced a severe financial 
deficit challenge to South Korea’s NHI and the deficit grew constantly each year (Kwon 2002; Lee 2003; 
Jeong 2005). The successful completion of universal insurance coverage has resulted in the rapid increase 
in health care expenditure in South Korea from $169 (4.0% of GDP) per capita in 1985 to $1,480 (6.4% of 
GDP) in 2006; an average annual growth rate of 36.9%.  
Since 1998, the cost containment and stabilization of the NHI financial deficit has been a pressing 
mission for the South Korean NHIC. To contain health care spending, two consumer-side schemes have 
been implemented in South Korea: requiring patients to obtain referrals from general practitioners to meet a 
specialist in general hospitals, and a high co-payment structure as a mechanism for suppressing the use of 
expensive and medically unnecessary treatments. These strategies, however, have not been regarded as 
very helpful in reducing health expenditure. Since the separation reform in pharmaceuticals, the total heath 
expenditure increased greatly from $36.2 billion in 2000, the year of the reform’s introduction, to $71.5 
billion in 2006; an average annual growth rate of 16%, which was much higher than that of 9.9% from 
1995 to 2000. The per capita health expenditure also rose dramatically from $771 in 2000 to $1,480 in 
2006; an average annual growth rate of 15.3%, which was much higher than that of 11.1% from 1995 to 
2000.  
The lesson to be learned from the South Korean experience in escalating health care costs is that 
governmental policies to regulate the supply side of the market are essential to maintain the financial 
worthiness of the NHI system. The five-year experience after the integration reform in South Korea 
indicates that government cost containment in the absence of effective monitoring on the supply side can 
no longer succeed in controlling health care expenditure (Kwon 2002; Lee 2003). The South Korean 
government acknowledged the need to control providers’ behavior and conducted several pilot programs of 
the Diagnosis-Related-Group (DRG) system in the reimbursement scheme. The outcomes of these pilot 
programs were encouraging: less spending for a specific disease treated under the DRG system than under 
the fee-for-service system where fees for services provided by hospitals and physicians are set by the 
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government (Kwon, 2002). Unfortunately, the government failed in its attempt to enact the DRG 
reimbursement system for the entire NHI system due to the fierce opposition of the providers, medical 
professionals and hospitals. Therefore, few cost containment programs have actually been developed in 
South Korea. The fixed fee scheme was the most effective government regulation on providers but was 
rapidly disrupted when it faced unexpectedly fierce strikes by physicians (Lee 2003; Kwon et al. 2005). 
The lack of regulation of the supply side and the expansion of insurance coverage to all citizens led to the 
rising health care costs (Kim et al. 2004). Furthermore, the rising health care cost was mostly shifted to 
consumers as a larger portion of their payrolls is deducted as their contributions. The relatively small  
portion of private expenditure (about 55% of the total health care expenditure) and the relatively high 
proportion of cost sharing (13.7%) and out-of-pocket spending (36.9%) by households in receiving health 
care are consequences of the weak monitoring power of the NHIC.  
Even though South Korea has achieved universal health insurance for all citizens in a very short 
time and possesses highly advanced medical technologies, the rapid increase in health care expenditure that 
has been experienced remains a burden to policy makers. In this regard, precisely understanding provider-
side incentive, as well as consumers’ behavior, in the health care market and constructing effective ways to 
monitor both consumers and providers are the most urgent and important elements of the policy agenda in 
South Korea’s future health care reform. The portion of the total OOP expenditure relative to total 
expenditure may need to be reduced so that people with limited private resources are not alienated from 
necessary medical care. As an example, the expedited provision of coverage for indispensable preventive 
services like immunization is desirable. In addition, enhanced public health programs against adverse 
health-related behaviors will be helpful for providing a better healthy life and hence curbing the rapidly 
growing health care costs in our aging society.   
 
 
References 
 
Anderson, G. 1989. “Universal Health Care Coverage.” Health Affairs 8(2): 24 –34. 
__________. 1997. “In Search of Value: An International Comparison of Cost, Access, and Outcomes.”  
 22 
           Health Affairs 16(6): 163-171.   
__________. and P. Hussey. 2001. “Comparing Health System Performance in OECD Countries.” Health  
            Affairs 20(3): 219- 232. 
Jeong, H. 2005. “Health Care Reform and Change in Public-Private Mix of Financing: A Korean Case.”  
            Health Policy 74: 133-145. 
Kim, H., W. Chung and S. Lee. 2004. “Lessens from Korea’s Pharmaceutical Policy Reform: The  
            Separation of Medical Institutions and Pharmacies for Outpatient Care.” Health Policy 68: 267-275. 
Kwon, S. 2002. “Achieving the Health Insurance for All: Lessens from the Republic of Korea.” Extension  
            of Social Security (ESS) Working Paper Series No. 1. Geneva, Switzerland: International Labor  
            Office. 
Kwon, S. 2003. “Healthcare Financing Reform and the New Single Payer System in the Republic of  
            Korea.” International Social Security Review 56: 64-83. 
Kwon, S. and M. Reich. 2005. “The Changing Process and Politics of Health Policy in Korea.” Journal of  
            Health Politics, Policy, and Law 30(6): 1003-1025. 
Lee, J. 2003. “Health Care Reform in South Korea: Success or Failure?” American Journal of Public Health  
            93(1): 48-51. 
Moon, S. and J. Shin. 2007. “Performance of Universal Health Insurance: Lessons from South Korea.”  
            World Health & Population, May: 1-19. 
National Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC). 1995, 2008. Statistical Year Book. Seoul, Republic of     
             Korea (in Korean): NHIC press. 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2008. OECD Health Data 2008. Paris:  
             France. 
Peabody J., S. Lee and S. Bickel. 1995. “Health for all in the Republic of Korea: One County’s Experience  
             with Implementing Universal Health Care.” Health Policy 31: 29-42. 
World Health Organization. 2000. Health Systems: Improving Performance. Geneva, Switzerland: WHO  
             Press.   
Yang. B., E. Bae, and J. Kim. 2008. Economic Evaluation and Pharmaceutical Reimbursement Reform in  
           South Korea’s National Health Insurance. Health Affairs, 27(1): 179-187. 
 23 
Yoo. S. and S. Moon. 2006. “Evaluating Performance of Finance Stabilization Program for National Health  
           Insurance.” Korean Journal of Policy Study, 15(3): 241-271 (In Korean).    
 
 
 
